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Abstract
In this paper we examine the local determinacy conditions for three
monetary policy regimes in a business cycle model with staggered price
setting. The central bank either controls the nominal interest rate, the
money growth rate, or it conducts open market operations and controls
the bond-to-money ratio herein. All instruments are set contingent on
changes in current in‡ation. For the …rst two cases, equilibrium determi-
nacy imposes strong restrictions on the endogenous response to changes
in in‡ation, which depend on whether …scal policy is Ricardian or non-
Ricardian. In the case of open market policy, Ricardian equivalence
does not hold and government solvency is guaranteed for …nite bond-
to-money ratios. The central bank can ensure determinacy by setting
the latter not in an extremely reactive way. The equilibrium sequence
of real …nancial wealth then exerts a stabilizing impact on prices and
real activity such that equilibrium multiplicity as well as explosiveness
is ruled out.
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Keywords: Open market operations, Ricardian non-equivalence, interac-
tion of monetary and …scal policy, …scal theory, equilibrium determinacy.
1University of Cologne, Department of Economics, D-50923 Koeln, Germany, email: schabert@wiso.uni-
koeln.de, fax: +49/221/470-5077, tel: +49/221/470-4532.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper aims at revealing if the central bank’s instrument-choice alters the requirements
for real equilibrium determinacy for di¤erent …scal policy regimes. Since Poole’s (1970)
analysis, di¤erent monetary policy instruments are known to be relevant for the ability of
monetary policy to stabilize real activity. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995) have further shown
that the choice between money growth and interest rate policy can substantially matter
for welfare. Recent monetary business cycle theory, however, which considers some kind
of nominal rigidity, mainly focuses on interest rate policy. One strand of this literature
is concerned with the problem of multiple equilibria or unstable paths enabled by policy
rules which are designed in an inappropriate way for a given structure of the economy and
for a given …scal policy regime (see, e.g., Benhabib et al., 2001a, Carlstrom and Fuerst,
2001, Dupor, 2001a, or, Meng, 2002). The interest in the interaction of monetary policy
with the latter mainly emerged with the seminal work of Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), and
Woodford (1994, 1995) followed by various contributions to the so-called ’Fiscal Theory of
the Price Level’ (FTPL),2 which has revealed that the price level can be determined by the
needs of …scal solvency in cases where it is not pinned down by the central bank setting the
nominal interest rate. Moreover, the particular …scal policy regime is crucial for equilibrium
determination, i.e., the restrictions on interest rate policy to ensure local determinacy, in an
environment where prices are not fully ‡exible (see Benhabib et al., 2001a). The literature,
however, leaves the question unanswered if …scal policy is still decisive for the requirements
for equilibrium determinacy when the central bank does not control the nominal interest rate.
In this paper we complement this line of research and examine how …scal policy a¤ects
equilibrium determinacy when the central bank uses alternative instruments such that the
nominal interest rate is endogenously determined. In particular, we consider regimes charac-
terized by a central bank setting the money growth rate or the stance of open market opera-
tions contingent on changes in the current in‡ation rate. Following Benhabib et al. (2001a),
…scal policy regimes di¤er with regard to their ability to guarantee government solvency and,
thus, the sequence of real wealth to ensure ful…llment of the households’ transversality con-
dition. As in the case of interest rate policy, Ricardian equivalence holds for a money growth
p o l i c y ,a n d… s c a lp o l i c yi sd e c i s i v ef o rt h ew a yt h ec e n t r a lb a n ks h o u l ds e tt h em o n e yg r o w t h
rate in response to changes in in‡ation in order to ensure equilibrium determinacy. When
the …scal policy regime guarantees government solvency (Ricardian policy), equilibrium de-
terminacy requires the money growth rate not to rise with in‡ation by more than one for
2See Woodford (2001a) for a comprehensive discussion of the FTPL.
2one. This restriction is, thus, exactly opposed to the well-known determinacy restriction on
interest rate rules, i.e., the Taylor-principle (see Woodford, 2001b). A non-Ricardian policy
…scal regime can,3 on the other hand, only lead to a uniquely determined equilibrium path
when it is accompanied by accommodating money growth rates rising by more than one for
one with changes in in‡ation, given that prices are not too rigid.
Turning to the case where the central bank controls the stance of open market operations,
we obtain fundamentally di¤erent results regarding the requirements for equilibrium deter-
minacy and the role of …scal policy. Closely following Shreft and Smith (1998, 2000), this
regime is speci…ed by, …rst, restricting the supply of money and government bonds on open
market operations, while, second, the central bank sets the ratio of outstanding bonds to
money.4 The latter induces Ricardian equivalence not to hold, which is of utmost importance
for the interaction of monetary and …scal policy. As money is linked to the outstanding stock
of government bonds, the government’s …nancing decision indirectly a¤ects money supply
and, thus, the willingness of households to consume. Hence, the equilibrium sequence of real
…nancial wealth, which equals total government liabilities and is a predetermined variable,
cannot be recursively determined as in the former monetary policy regimes. On the other
hand, as the central bank relates the stocks of both government liabilities, government sol-
vency and, thus, a Ricardian policy regime is ensured as long as the bond-to-money ratio
takes …nite values. Examining the local dynamics for the open market regime reveals that
determinacy requires the bond-to-money ratio not to be extremely reactive to changes in
in‡ation. Ricardian non-equivalence together with the induced government solvency is re-
sponsible for the equilibrium sequence of real …nancial wealth to exert a stabilizing impact
on the economy, ruling out multiple equilibria and explosiveness. Hence, Shreft and Smith’s
(1998, 2000) open market regime is more appropriate than a money growth or an interest
rate regime for a central bank which aims at avoiding the economy to be destabilized.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In section 3 we
derive the determinacy conditions for the three policy regimes. Section 4 concludes.
2 A sticky price model
In this section we develop a continuous time monetary business cycle model where prices are
set in a staggered way. The model mainly di¤ers from the one in Benhabib et al. (2001a)
by allowing for endogenous labor supply and by considering three di¤erent monetary policy
regimes: interest rate policy, money growth policy, and open market policy.
3In particular, we apply Dupor’s (2001b) speci…cation of open market operations as a non-Ricardian regime.
4Similar monetary policy regimes can be found in Wallace (1984) or in Battacharya and Kudoh (2002).
32.1 The household sector
Nominal variables are denoted by upper-case letters, while real variables are denoted by
lower-case letters. The economy is populated by a continuum of identical households. A
representative household is in…nitely lived, with preferences given by the value of a discounted
stream of instantaneous utility u(:):
Z 1
0
e¡µtu(c;l;m)dt; with µ>0; (1)
where c denotes consumption, l leisure, m = M
P real balances, M cash, P the aggregate price
level, and µ the discount factor. Following Sidrauski (1967) we introduce real balances in
the utility function as a short-cut for assuming that they provide transaction services. The
utility function satis…es assumption 1 implying that it is separable with regard to all of its
arguments.5
Assumption 1 The utility function u(c;l;m) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice
continuously di¤erentiable, and satis…es the usual Inada conditions and uxy =0for x 6= y
with x;y 2f c;l;mg.
We normalize the total time endowment equal to one, such that labor supply n is given
by: n =1¡ l. Households are further endowed with …nancial wealth denoted by A,w h i c h
consists of cash holdings M and holdings of government bonds B : A = M + B.T h e
households’ income comprises labor remuneration, interest payments on government bonds,
and pro…ts of …rms which are owned by the households. The ‡ow budget constraint of a
representative household is given by
_ a =( R ¡ ¼)a ¡ Rm + wn¡ c ¡ ¿ + Ã; (2)
where a ´ A=P, P; w, ¿, R, ¼,a n dÃ denotes real …nancial wealth, the aggregate price
level, the real wage, a lump sum tax, the nominal interest rate, the in‡ation rate, and
the real pro…ts of …rms, respectively. Throughout the paper, we assume that the stock
of government bonds is non-negative (B ¸ 0). Imposing this restriction we rule out that
households borrow funds from the public sector. The household maximizes (1) by choosing
sequences for consumption, leisure, real balances, and real wealth, for a given initial stock





0(R(v)¡¼(v))dv] ¸ 0; taking prices, public policy,
5Though, we are aware of the fact that non-separability of u(:) matters for real determinacy, as shown in
Matsuyama (1990), Matheny (1998), or Benhabib et al. (2001), separability is assumed for simplicity.







=R ¡ ¼ ¡ µ; (6)











must be satis…ed in the household’s optimum.
2.2 The production sector
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive …rms. Each …rm i 2 [0;1] supplies a
single di¤erentiated good yi aggregated to the composite …nal good; the latter can be thought
of being produced by perfectly competitive production units. The aggregation technology




i di; where yi and ">1 denotes the quantity of the i-th di¤erentiated good and
the elasticity of substitution between any two di¤erentiated goods, respectively. As each
…rm i produces exactly one variant of the di¤erentiated output good yi, the relevant demand














where P denotes the aggregate price index and Pi the price of the di¤erentiated good indexed
with i. As commonly assumed in the literature, …rms have access to a production technology
with labor as the single input. The production technology of a …rm i, which is assumed to
b el i n e a ri nl a b o r ,r e a d s :
yi = ni: (9)
We introduce staggered prices as proposed by Calvo (1983). Firms set their prices to maximize
a discounted stream of current and future real pro…ts. They are assumed to be able to adjust
prices only when they receive a random signal. Otherwise, they set their prices along with
the steady state in‡ation rate ¼. The time interval until the arrival of a random price-change
signal is exponentially distributed such that the probability of not being allowed to adjust
prices between dates t and s>tis exp(¡±[s¡t]),w i t h±>0.I np e r i o dt a… r mi receiving a
5price signal sets the price P¤
t , where the index i can be dropped from P¤
t as all …rms receiving




















where MC denotes the nominal marginal costs. Note that the term in square brackets in
(10) gives real pro…ts in s if the …rm has last adjusted in time t, which is discounted with the
probability of not adjusting and with the pricing kernel ¸se¡µ(s¡t) taken from the consumer’s
maximization problem. Maximization of (10) with respect to P¤
t f o rag i v e ni n i t i a lp r i c el e v e l






t e¡(±+µ)(s¡t)¸s e P"¡1
s ys g MCsds
R 1
t e¡(±+µ)(s¡t)¸s e P"¡1
s ysds
; (11)
with e Xs ´ Xs=e¼(s¡t); for X = P;MC. The …rst order condition in (11), together with the
price index given in (8), can be transformed into a linear di¤erential equation in ¼.6 After
linearly approximating (8) and (11), we obtain the following aggregate supply constraint
_ ¼ = µ(¼ ¡ ¼) ¡ ±(± + µ)
"
" ¡ 1
(mc ¡ mc); (12)
where x denotes the steady state value of x = ¼;mc. The derivation of this continuous time
version of the ’New Keynesian Phillips Curve’ follows Benhabib et al. (2001a) and is given
in the appendix. With perfect mobility of labor between di¤erent …rms, pro…t maximization
causes each …rm to choose a labor demand schedule where real marginal costs mc = MC=P
a r ee q u a lt ot h ew a g er a t e :
w = mc: (13)
2.3 The public sector
The public sector consists of the …scal authority and the central bank. The …scal authority
issues riskless bonds of immediate maturity B, pays interest RB on outstanding debt, collects
lump-sum taxes ¿ from households, and receives a transfer ¿c from the central bank. Its
budget constraint, thus, reads: _ B + P(¿ + ¿c)=RB. The central bank issues money and
transfers the receipts from money creation to the …scal authority: _ M = P¿c. Hence, the
6An analogous procedure is presented in Yun (1996) for a discrete time model.
6consolidated budget constraint reads
_ B + _ M + P¿ = RB: (14)
Monetary policy regimes We consider three di¤erent monetary policy regimes. In or-
der to treat them symmetrically, all instruments are set contingent on the current in‡ation
rate. The …rst regime, which speci…ed by closely following Shreft and Smith (1998, 2000), is
characterized by the central bank supplying money via open market operations. Changes in
the outstanding stock of money are restricted to be accompanied by inverse changes in the
outstanding stock of government bonds less interest earnings
_ M = ¡( _ B ¡ RB): (15)
According to the exchange restriction for open market operations (15), the costs of money
acquisition rises with the nominal interest rate. Furthermore, this monetary policy regime
implies, P¿c = ¡( _ B ¡RB), such that taxes ¿ are equal to zero: P¿ =0(see 14). Seignorage
exactly o¤sets the treasury’s net earnings from bond issuance such that public sector net
receipts P¿, which ought to be transferred to balance the budget, are always equal to zero.
In combination with the open market restriction (15), the central bank sets the ratio ¯ of
outstanding public liabilities contingent on the current in‡ation rate
B
M
= ¯(¼); with ¯>0. (16)
We further assume that ¯(¼) has a unique solution for the steady state condition ¯(¼)=µ=¼
for ¼>0. De…ning total government liabilities S ´ M +B and using the policy rule (16), the
open market restriction (15), which can be rewritten as _ S = RS¡RM, leads to the following
restriction for the evolution of government liabilities
_ S =
h
1 ¡ (1 + ¯(¼))
¡1
i
RS , _ s =
³h






Hence, total government liabilities S can only grow with the nominal interest rate if ¯ con-
verges to in…nity. Otherwise, the evolution of real government liabilities s ´ S=P,w h i c h
equals real wealth in equilibrium, is restricted such that their growth rate is smaller than the
real interest rate (R ¡ ¼) implying that the households’s transversality condition (7) cannot
be violated.
The second regime is characterized by the central bank setting the nominal interest rate
on government bonds. Following related studies (see, Benhabib et al., 2001a, Dupor, 2001a,
or, Meng, 2002), we assume that the nominal interest rate is set according to the following
7simple rule
R = ½(¼); with ½>0: (18)
To avoid multiple stationary equilibria, we assume that the policy rule (18) has exactly one
solution for the steady state condition ½(¼)=¼ + µ for ¼>0.7 As money supply is not
further restricted, the …scal authority is free to set the sequence of transfers P¿.
This property also characterizes the third monetary policy regime where the central bank
controls the growth rate of money. As in the former regimes, we allow for the money growth
rate to depend on the current in‡ation rate
_ M
M
= ¹(¼); with ¹>0: (19)
We further assume that ¹(¼) has a unique solution for the steady state condition ¹(¼)=¼
for ¼>0.
Fiscal policy regimes In order to facilitate comparisons between all regimes we introduce
a simple …scal policy rule being su¢ciently general to encompass those cases which will turn
out to have di¤erent qualitative consequences for real determinacy. In particular, we assume
that taxes are set according to
P¿ = #RS ¡ RM: (20)
A comparison of the government budget constraint (14) with (17) reveals that the open
market policy implies # =[ 1+¯(¼)]
¡1. On the contrary, the policy parameter needs to be
set by the …scal authority in the case of interest rate or money growth policy. Following
Benhabib et al. (2001a), we will distinguish two cases. The …rst case is characterized by a
strictly positive value # = #R > 0 implying that the public sector solvency is always satis…ed:










Note that the solvency constraint, given on the right hand side of (21), equals the transversal-
ity constraint (7) in equilibrium. Following Benhabib et al. (2001a), this …scal policy regime
is called Ricardian. The alternative …scal policy regime is given by # = #N = M=S ) ¿ =0
such that the evolution of government liabilities satis…es
_ s =( R ¡ ¼)s ¡ Rm: (22)
7See Benhabib et al. (2002a, 2002b) for the consequences of the zero bound on nominal interest rates for
global and local determinacy.
8As pointed out by Dupor (2001b), this particular tax policy does not ensure government
solvency and can therefore actually lead to a non-Ricardian policy regime. Given that (22)
holds, s can grow with the real interest rate (R ¡ ¼)s u c ht h a tg o v e r n m e n ts o l v e n c yi sn o t
guaranteed outside the equilibrium for s0 > 0. In the case of interest rate or money growth
policy, government solvency and, thus, the households’ transversality condition (7) must be
explicitly considered for equilibrium determination.
It is important to note that the …rst monetary policy regime is associated with the tax
rule: P¿ =0 . Hence, …scal policy is not su¢cient to ensure government solvency. However, as
the central bank controls the ratio of bonds to money to be constant in the long-run, public
expenditures are not only …nanced by issuance of interest bearing assets (B)a sl o n ga s¯
takes a …nite value. Hence, for an open market regime the growth rate of real government
liabilities will be smaller than the real interest rate (R ¡ ¼)f o r¯<1 implying that the
public sector is solvent (see 17).
2.4 Equilibrium
A perfect foresight equilibrium of this economy is a set of sequences of the model’s endoge-
nous variables f¸ ;c ;n ;¼ ;m c ;w ;s ;a ;m ;b ;R g characterized by i.) the …rst order conditions
of the households, (3) to (6); ii.) the …rms’ …rst order conditions, (12) and (13), as well as the
aggregate version of the production function (9); iii.) a monetary-…scal policy regime char-
acterized by a combination of policy rules given in table 1; iv.) the transversality condition
of households (7), and v.) market clearance, such that the aggregate resource constraints of
the goods and asset markets hold, y = c and a = s, for a given initial value for real …nancial
wealth a0 = A0=P0 > 0,a sw e l la sf o rr e a lb a l a n c e sm0 = M0=P0 > 0 for the money growth
policy regimes (MGR and MGN).
Table 1 Monetary-…scal policy regimes
Central bank instrument Fiscal policy regime
OM b=m = ¯(¼)_ s =( R ¡ ¼)s ¡ Rm
IRR R = ½(¼)_ s =[ ( 1¡ #R)R ¡ ¼]s
IRN R = ½(¼)_ s =( R ¡ ¼)s ¡ Rm
MGR _ m=m + ¼ = ¹(¼)_ s =[ ( 1¡ #R)R ¡ ¼]s
MGN _ m=m + ¼ = ¹(¼)_ s =( R ¡ ¼)s ¡ Rm
3 Monetary-…scal policy regimes and equilibrium determinacy
In this section we derive the conditions for local determinacy for the …ve monetary-…scal
policy regimes listed in table 1. Apparently, open market policy restricts …scal policy in a
9particular way, whereas the other two monetary policy rules can be accompanied by either
a Ricardian (R) or a non-Ricardian (N) …scal policy regime. Hence, interest rate policy
(IR) and money growth policy (MG) are considered with both …scal policy regimes, whereas
the open market policy (OM) regime is always associated with a consolidated public sector
budget constraint satisfying:_ s =
£
¯(1 + ¯)¡1R ¡ ¼
¤
s.
In order to examine the conditions for local determinacy we linearize the equilibrium con-
ditions at the steady state. The latter, consisting of the endogenous variables fc;¸;m;¼;Rg,






R=¼ + µ; (25)
and either R = R(¼) f o ra ni n t e r e s tr a t ep o l i c yo r¹(¼)=¼ for a money growth policy. In
these cases, the equilibrium sequence of real wealth does not directly a¤ect the remainder of
the economy. Hence, real wealth is not restricted to be constant in the steady state. In the
case of an open market policy, a steady state, however, requires, by (16), a stationary value
for real wealth given by a =( 1+¯(¼))m. As we further assumed that b ¸ 0 and because real
balances will be positive in the steady state, by (24), we can conclude that a>0 and _ a =0
implying ¼ = ¯(¼)µ and a = mR=µ by (17) and (25). It then follows from assumption 1, the
conditions (23)-(25), and the prevailing policy rule that the steady state is unique and that
all endogenous variables exhibit a positive value in the steady state.
We proceed the analysis with the case where the central bank sets the nominal interest
rate, i.e., regime IRR and IRN, and derive determinacy results consistent with the …ndings
in Benhabib et al. (2001a). We then examine money growth policy and show that the
reactiveness, again, decides on determinacy for the MGR and the MGN regime. In the last
part of this section we show that the OM regime behaves di¤erently as Ricardian equivalence
is obviously invalid given that money supply is, by (16), linked to the amount of government
bonds outstanding. Hence, a change in public debt alters the shadow price of wealth, by (5),
and, therefore, households’ willingness to consume and their labor supply.
Remark 1 Ricardian equivalence does not hold for the OM regime.
To give a preview, the relevance of real …nancial wealth, which equals real government liabili-
ties in equilibrium and is a predetermined state variable, will exert a stabilizing impact on the
dynamics of the model for the OM regime such that the model is less prone to equilibrium
multiplicity than for the other monetary policy regimes.
103.1 Interest rate policy
In the case where the central bank sets the nominal interest rate according to (18), reduction
of the linearized equilibrium conditions leads to the following two conditions in ¼ and ¸
_ ¸=¡¸(½¼ ¡ 1)(¼ ¡ ¼) ¡
¡
R ¡ ¼ ¡ µ
¢
(¸ ¡ ¸); (26)






with ¾l ´¡ ulll
ul and ¾c ´¡ uccc
uc , and a non-linearized condition for the evolution of real
wealth either given by
_ a =[ ( 1¡ #R)½(¼) ¡ ¼]a (28)
for the Ricardian …scal policy (IRR regime), or by
_ a =( ½(¼) ¡ ¼)a ¡ ½(¼)m(½(¼);¸) (29)
for a non-Ricardian …scal policy (IRN regime). The function m(½(¼);¸) in (29) follows from
assumption 1 and (5). In principle, the rate of in‡ation and the shadow price of wealth are
determined by (26) and (27), while the equilibrium sequence of real wealth can recursively be
derived from (28) or (29). In particular, the evolution of real wealth is completely irrelevant
for the equilibrium sequences for ¼ and ¸ when …scal policy is Ricardian (# = #A) such that
the government solvency constraint, which equals the transversality condition in equilibrium,
is always satis…ed. Hence, equilibrium determinacy for the IRR regime requires that the
two eigenvalues of the 2 £ 2 system (26) and (27) are unstable given that ¼ and ¸ are jump
variables.
In the case where the …scal policy chooses a sequence of taxes, which does not ensure
solvency (non-Ricardian …scal policy), the evolution of real wealth, governed by (29), must
be taken into account for determination of ¼ and ¸ as real wealth can potentially violate
the transversality condition (7). Hence, the latter, which is satis…ed by public policy in the
Ricardian case (28), now imposes an additional restriction on the equilibrium sequences of ¼,
¸; and a for the IRN regime. However, the eigenvalue of the last equation (28) model can be
separately determined. Given that real wealth is a predetermined variable (with a0 > 0)a n d
the condition (29) introduces a unstable eigenvalue, which equals ½(¼) ¡ ¼ = µ, equilibrium
determinacy now requires that the 2 £ 2 system (26) and (27) exhibits one stable and one
unstable eigenvalue. The requirements for the conduct of monetary policy, which ensure
determinacy for the IIR and the IRN regime, are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the central bank sets the nominal interest rate according to (18).
Then there exists a unique equilibrium path converging to the steady state if
111. ½¼ > 1 for the IRR regime, otherwise there exists a continuum of equilibrium paths,
2. ½¼ < 1 for the IRN regime, otherwise there exists no stable equilibrium path.
Proof. The claims made in the proposition can easily be veri…ed by examining the 2 £ 2




















Using R¡¼¡µ =0 ,t h et r a c eo ft h em a t r i xA½,w h i c hi sg i v e nb ytrace(A½)=µ>0,i ss t r i c t l y
positive indicating that there is at least one positive eigenvalue. The sign of the determinant
of A½ depends on the partial derivative of the interest rate rule:d e t ( A½)=© 1¸(½¼ ¡ 1).
When ½¼ > 1, the determinant is positive and there are two unstable eigenvalues, while there
is one stable and one unstable eigenvalue if ½¼ < 1.H e n c e ,t h eIRR regime exhibits a unique
(continuum of) equilibrium path(s) if ½¼ > 1 (½¼ < 1), whereas the IRN regime is associated
with a unique (unstable) equilibrium path if ½¼ < 1 (½¼ > 1). ¥
The results summarized in proposition 1, which are consistent with the results in Benhabib
et al. (2001a) and Woodford (2001), reveal that local determinacy crucially relies on the
reactiveness of monetary policy measured by ½¼. W h e ni n ‡ a t i o ni sh i g ha n dt h ec e n t r a l
bank raises the nominal interest rate by less than one for one (½¼ < 1), the real interest rate
and, therefore, the shadow price of wealth declines (see 26), so that households are willing
to save less and to consume more exerting an upward pressure on prices. Hence, in‡ation
expectations can be self-ful…lling when interest rate policy is passive (½¼ < 1). However, the
conditions for equilibrium determinacy depend on the …scal policy regime. The determinacy
conditions are exactly opposed such that there is no robust strategy for the central bank
to ensure determinacy. A Ricardian …scal policy requires an active interest rate policy –
also known as the Taylor-principle – for equilibrium uniqueness, whereas a non-Ricardian
policy must be accompanied by a passive interest rate to avoid explosiveness. For any …scal
policy regime, there are multiple equilibrium paths for ¼ and ¸ satisfying (26) and (27) which
converge to the steady state for a passive interest rate policy. In the case where …scal policy
is non-Ricardian, however, ful…llment of the transversality condition imposes an additional
restriction on the equilibrium values of ¼ and ¸ leading to a uniquely determined equilibrium
(see also Benhabib et al., 2001a).
3.2 Money growth policy
Now suppose that the central bank sets the money growth rate according to (19). The
linearized model can not further be reduced than to a 3£3 system as the real value of money
12m, which could be recursively determined for interest rate policy, is a predetermined state
variable given that the central bank determines the future stock of nominal money and that
prices are sticky. The linearized equilibrium conditions for ¼, ¸,a n dm are given by





_ ¼ =µ(¼ ¡ ¼)+© 1(¸ ¡ ¸); (31)
_ m=m(¹¼ ¡ 1)(¼ ¡ ¼); (32)
and by an equilibrium condition for real wealth either given by (28) for the MGR regime, or
by (29) for the MGN regime. Before we turn to the determinacy conditions we introduce,
for simplicity, an additional assumption restricting real balances to enter the utility function
at least in a logarithmic way; the latter is commonly used as a lower bound for the elasticity
of marginal utility ¡ummm
um (see, e.g., Dupor, 2001a).
Assumption 2 The intertempotal substitution elasticity of real balances 1=¾m ´¡ um
ummm
satis…es ¾m ¸ 1.
Corresponding to the case where the central bank sets the nominal interest rate, real wealth
does not a¤ect the equilibrium sequences for the in‡ation rate, the shadow price of wealth, and
real balances when …scal policy is Ricardian (28). Thus, for the MGRregime, the equilibrium
condition for real wealth (28) can again be neglected and equilibrium determinacy requires
the 3 £ 3 system (30)-(32) to exhibit one stable and two unstable eigenvalues given that it
features exactly one predetermined variable (m). In contrast, the MGN regime additionally
introduces an additional state variable (a) with an unstable eigenvalue (µ)b y( 2 9 )s u c ht h a t
determinacy requires (30)-(32) to have two stable and one unstable eigenvalues. Similar to the
case of interest rate policy, the 3£3 system (30)-(32) exhibits multiple sets of equilibria paths
for f¸;¼;mg, from which ful…llment of the transversality condition selects a set associated
with a stable path for real wealth. The following proposition summarizes the determinacy
conditions for both regimes.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the central bank sets the money growth rate according to (19).
Then there exists a unique equilibrium path converging to the steady state if
1. ¹¼ < 1 for the MGR regime, otherwise there exists a continuum of stable equilibrium
paths if ©1 < e © and no stable equilibrium path if ©1 > e ©,
2. ¹¼ > 1 and ©1 < e © for the MGN regime, otherwise there is no stable equilibrium path,

































The trace of A¹ is positive and reads:t race(A¹)= R + µ>0. The determinant, given by
det = ¡umm©1m(¹¼ ¡ 1),i sn e g a t i v ef o r¹¼ < 1. This ensures the existence of one stable and
two unstable roots, which leads to determinacy for the MGR regime. For the MGN regime
the system (30)-(32) has to be characterized by two stable eigenvalues to avoid explosiveness.
If ¹¼ > 1;A ¹ can either have three or one positive (unstable) root. However, we know that
when ¡A¹ exhibits three negative (stable) roots, A¹ has only positive (unstable) roots.





< 0, the determinant, det(¡A¹)=umm©1m(¹¼ ¡ 1) with det(¡A¹) < 0 if ¹¼ > 1,






































¡R ¡ µ 0 ¡umm













> 0 the roots
of ¡A¹ cannot all be stable, such that A¹ exhibits at least one stable root. This is the case
if





R + µ ¡ umm
m
¸ (¹¼ ¡ 1)
uc
¡1:
As it has already been shown that A¹ either has two stable or only unstable roots, we can
conclude that A¹ has exactly two stable roots for the case ¹¼ > 1, if prices are su¢ciently




> e ©. In this case, a non-Ricardian
…scal policy regime is associated with a stable and uniquely determined equilibrium path. ¥
As for the interest rate policy regimes, equilibrium determinacy critically hinges on the re-
sponse of the money growth rate to changes in‡ation ¹¼. In the case where …scal policy
is Ricardian (MGR) the in‡ation response ought to be less than one (¹¼ < 1) to ensure
determinacy. Hence, the prominent and most commonly applied constant money growth rule
(¹¼ =0 ) also leads to a uniquely determined equilibrium for a Ricardian policy.8 When the
8Similarly, Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) show that a constant money growth policy ensures real determinacy
(for plausible money demand elasticities) in a ‡exible price cash-in-advance model.
14in‡ation response is larger than one ¹¼ > 1, a rise in the in‡ation rate will be accompanied
by a rise in real balances, which stimulates the economy leading to an upward pressure on
the price level. In this case the model can exhibit either multiple equilibrium paths or an
unstable equilibrium path depending on the degree of price stickiness ±, the latter being a
main component of the composite parameter ©1 with @©1=@± > 0. The condition in part 2
of proposition 2 reveals that the MGR regime allows for self-ful…lling in‡ation expectations,
when prices are su¢ciently ‡exible ©1 < e © (with e © > 0 given that ¹¼ > 1). Otherwise, a rise
in money growth in response to higher in‡ation will be accompanied by a strong real stimu-
lation (small ¸), which further feeds in‡ation by (31) such that the economy will evolve on
an explosive path. On the contrary, a non-Ricardian …scal policy in a MGN regime demands
money growth policy to be accommodating (¹¼ > 1) and prices to be su¢ciently ‡exible
(©1 < e ©) to obtain a unique and stable equilibrium path for the set {¼;¸;m;a}.
3.3 Open market policy
Now suppose that the central bank conducts open market operations according to (15), so
that issuance of money and bonds is interrelated, and sets the ratio of bonds to money (16)
herein. Analogous to the previous regimes, the policy instrument ¯ i ss e tc o n t i n g e n to nt h e
current in‡ation rate.9 We linearize the model and eliminate the nominal interest rate with
the …rst order condition for money (5). Money can further be replaced by applying the policy
rule, a = m[1 + ¯(¼)], such that the model in ¸; ¼; and a reads
_ ¸=µ(1 + ¯(¼))(¸ ¡ ¸)+© 2(¼ ¡ ¼) ¡ umm(1 + ¯(¼))¡1(a ¡ a); (33)
_ ¼ =µ(¼ ¡ ¼)+© 1(¸ ¡ ¸); (34)
_ a=¡µ¯(¼)¾m(a ¡ a) ¡ ©3(¸ ¡ ¸) ¡ ©4 [¼ ¡ ¼]; (35)








2 > 0; (36)
©4 ´m
£
(1 + ¯(¼)) ¡ ¯¼µ(1 + ¯(¼)¾m)
¤
:
It is crucial to note that the model substantially di¤ers from the former cases, where real
wealth does not a¤ect the …rst two equations. Here, real wealth actually enters equation (33)
such that the eigenvalue of real wealth cannot separately be determined. In contrast to the
former cases, where the di¤erential equation for _ a, given by (28) or (29), was unambiguously
9As a monetary tightening corresponds to a rise in the bond-to-money ratio (see Shreft and Smith, 1998,
2000), the ratio ¯ should satisfy ¯¼ ¸ 0 for a monetary policy regime aiming at stabilizing the economy.
15associated with an unstable eigenvalue, we are now interested in deriving conditions for a
negative eigenvalue which can be assigned to real wealth. The model further requires two
unstable eigenvalues for the remaining variables ¸ and ¼. Analyzing the local dynamics of
the model, we …nd that determinacy of the model can be ensured if the partial derivative ¯¼
is small enough. The following proposition summarizes this …nding.
Proposition 3 Suppose that money supply is restricted by (15) and that the central bank
sets the bond-to-money ratio according to (16). Then there exists a unique equilibrium path




































The determinant of A¯ is given by
det(A¯)=¡(1 + ¯(¼))µ3¯(¼)¾m ¡ ©3µumm(1 + ¯(¼))¡1 (38)
+umm(1 + ¯(¼))¡1©1©4 + µ¯(¼)¾m©1©2:
Inserting ©3 ´
m¯(¼)
um [µ(1 + ¯(¼))]
2, the …rst line in (38) vanishes such that det(A¯) reduces
to det(A¯)=© 1
¡
µ¯(¼)¾m©2 + umm(1 + ¯(¼))¡1©4
¢
. Further using the de…nitions for the
composite parameter ©2 and ©4 (see 36) and simplifying gives:





For ¯¼ < 1=µ, which will be assumed in what follows, det(A¯) is negative implying that there
are either one or three stable eigenvalues. Otherwise, the model would exhibit two stable or
only unstable roots, indicating either equilibrium indeterminacy or explosiveness. In order
to identify the cases where there is exactly one stable eigenvalue, which ensures equilibrium
determinacy, we further have to examine the trace of A¯,w h i c hi sg i v e nb y :
trace(A¯)=µ(2 + ¯(¼)(1¡ ¾m)):
For ¯(¼) < 2=(¾m ¡ 1), the trace is positive such that there must be at least one unstable
eigenvalue. Hence, we know that the 3 £ 3 matrix A¯ has one stable and two unstable
eigenvalues if the monetary policy rule satis…es ¯(¼) < 2=(¾m ¡ 1) and ¯¼ < 1=µ. However,
16we further have to consider the case where ¯(¼) > 2=(¾m ¡ 1) implying that the trace is
negative. Here, the model exhibits either one or three stable eigenvalues. The latter demands





µ(1 + ¯(¼)) + µ 0 umm(1 + ¯(¼))¡1
¡©4 µ(1 + ¯(¼)) ¡ µ¯(¼)¾m ©2




to have a negative determinant (see proof of proposition 2), which is given by
det(A¯)=µ3 (2 + ¯(¼))(1 + ¯(¼)(1¡ ¾m))(1 ¡ ¯(¼)¾m) ¡ umm(1 + ¯(¼))¡1©4©1
¡©3µ(1 + ¯(¼)(1¡ ¾m))umm(1 + ¯(¼))¡1 ¡ ©1©2µ(2 + ¯(¼)):
Replacing the composite parameter by their de…nitions in (36) and rearranging gives
det(A¯)=( ( ¾m ¡ 1)¯(¼) ¡ 1)
·








Given that ¾m ¸ 1 and ¯(¼) > 2=(¾m ¡ 1), the determinant of A¯ exclusively consists of
positive terms if ¯¼ < 1=(¾mµ). In this case, the determinant will clearly be positive such
that the model cannot exhibit three stable roots. Hence, ¯¼ < 1=(¾mµ),w h i c hi m p l i e s( b y
assumption 2) that ¯¼ < 1=µ is ful…lled, is su¢cient to ensure that the model exhibits one
stable and two unstable eigenvalues. ¥
The su¢cient condition (37) presents an upper bound for the reactiveness of the monetary
policy instrument ¯ to changes in in‡ation. This upper bound is certainly much larger than
one given that the discount rate µ equals the steady state real interest rate. The result
presented in proposition 3, thus, indicates that the central bank can ensure the existence of
a stable and uniquely determined equilibrium path by setting the bond-to-money ratio not
in an extremely reactive way. However, the upper bound on ¯¼ actually depends on a utility
parameter ¾m, whereas the determinacy conditions for money growth policy and interest
rate policy refer to a numerical threshold, namely, one. Nevertheless, pegging the ratio of
bond-to-money, as for example assumed in Shreft and Smith (1998, 2000), is a safe strategy
for a central bank to ensure equilibrium determinacy.
The reason for open market policy to exert a stabilizing impact on the economy by ruling
out self-ful…lling expectations can be rationalized as follows. Suppose that in‡ation rises.
Given that the evolution of real wealth is restricted by open market operations (15), this
tends to reduce the stock of real government liabilities and, thus, real …nancial wealth. Given
that the latter is linked to money by the ratio ¯, changes in real wealth are passed through
17to proportional changes in real bonds and real balances, a¤ecting marginal utility according
to assumption 1. This exerts, by (33), an upward pressure on the shadow price of wealth in
the subsequent periods, accompanied by a decline in consumption by (3). Forward looking
price setters are thus willing to lower prices such that in‡ation expectations cannot be self-
ful…lling in this economy. This stabilizing e¤ect of real wealth, however, demands that the
central bank sets the bond-to-money ratio not in an extremely reactive way (¯¼ < 1
¾mµ).
Otherwise, a rise in in‡ation would lead to a strong rise in government bonds, which would
heavily increase the interest payment obligations of the public sector. As this would lead to
a further issuance of public liabilities, this can either lead to multiple equilibrium paths or
to explosiveness.
4C o n c l u s i o n
It is shown in this paper that the requirements for monetary policy to ensure local determinacy
critically hinge on, …rst, whether the …scal policy regime is Ricardian or non-Ricardian and
on, second, the particular central bank instrument. Similar to the case of interest rate policy,
equilibrium determinacy for a money growth regime, where the central bank sets the growth
rate of nominal money contingent on changes in in‡ation, depends on the magnitude of
monetary policy reactiveness. Opposed to the well-known Taylor-principle for interest rate
policy, the central bank should raise the money growth rate by less than one for one to
changes in in‡ation when …scal policy is Ricardian. A non-Ricardian …scal policy regime,
however, requires the central bank to increase the money growth rate by more than one for
one to ensure determinacy, given that prices are not too rigid.
In contrast, it is shown that an open market policy regime, …rst, induces government
solvency to be satis…ed even outside the equilibrium, and, second, is much less prone to
equilibrium multiplicity or explosiveness. In particular, local determinacy is ensured as long
as the central bank sets the ratio of government bonds and money not extremely reactive
to changes in in‡ation. The crucial feature is that Ricardian equivalence does not hold such
that real activity and in‡ation is a¤ected by the equilibrium sequence of government debt
and, therefore, real …nancial wealth, whereas the latter can be recursively determined for
the alternative monetary policy regimes, where Ricardian equivalence holds. Given that the
open market policy restricts the issuance of public debt, real …nancial wealth, which is a
predetermined variable, evolves in a non-explosive way and is shown to rule out self-ful…lling
expectations. Our results, hence, indicate that a central bank, which aims at stabilizing
the economy, should conduct monetary policy by implementing a moderately reactive open
market policy.
185 Appendix: Derivation of the aggregate supply constraint





























s ys g MCsds;
w h e r ew ed e … n e e Xs ´ Xs=e¼(s¡t);X = P;MC: Dividing both sides by Pt and letting
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where, as usual, bars over variables denote the respective steady state values. Note that,
in steady state, we have the following relations: Ps grows with the rate ¼; whereas e Ps is
constant (as are ¸s and ys). Further, the price chosen by an adjusting …rm must equal the
aggregate price index, such that qt =1 : The constant elasticity property of the demand
function implies that the steady state price level is a constant markup over nominal marginal
costs, Ps = "=("¡1)MCs: Therefore, as Ps = Pte¼(s¡t); we have that "=("¡1)g MCs=Pt =1 ;


















Noting that ( g MCs ¡ g MCs)=g MCs =( MCs ¡ MCs)=MCs and de…ning real marginal costs
as mcs = MCs=Ps, this can be written as
qt ¡ qt
qt












The last term in square brackets in the preceding expression is a function of the deviations of
the in‡ation rates between t and s from steady state in‡ation, as from Ps=Pt =e x p (
R s
t ¼rdr)
it follows that (Ps=Pt¡Ps=Pt)=Ps=Pt =
R s
t (¼r¡¼)dr: Using this and di¤erentiating (40) with






























¡ (¼t ¡ ¼t): (41)
This can be converted into a di¤erential equation in ¼ by …nding the relation between,
respectively, the steady state deviations and the growth rates of in‡ation and the real reset





can be expressed as a function of past reset
prices, where each historical reset price has to be weighted by the probability that a price
s e ta tt i m es is not adjusted in time t,w h i c hi sg i v e nb y±expf¡±(t ¡ s)g (see Calvo, 1983,












which when linearized around the steady state implies
¼t ¡ ¼t = ±(qt ¡ qt): (42)
20Using (42) in (41) and noting that qt =1and mct =( " ¡ 1)=", this …nally results in




This is the linearized economy’s aggregate supply constraint (12).
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